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Notes and Comments
Armstrong v. McAlpin: Screening Former
Government Attorneys
I. Introduction
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility' forbids a
former government attorney from accepting private employ-
ment2 in the same matters for which he had substantial respon-
1. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmLrrY (1979). This note will refer to the
current Model Code of Professional Responsibility [hereinafter referred to as the Model
Code or the Code], and to the proposed alternative draft of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct [hereinafter referred to as Model Rules] which will be presented to the
House Delegates of the American Bar Association [hereinafter the ABA] for approval in
1982. The proposed Model Rules have been drafted in two different formats, one of
which will be chosen by the delegates. The first retains the format of the current Code
which includes the canons, disciplinary rules, and ethical considerations, while the sec-
ond draft adopts the Restatement format of the American Law Institute, and abolishes
the use of disciplinary rules and ethical considerations. Reference in this note to the
proposed Model Rules will be to the first format.
The canons are statements of axiomatic standards of professional conduct expected
of lawyers. They embody general concepts from which ethical considerations and disci-
plinary rules are derived. The ethical considerations [hereinafter referred to as EC] are
aspirational in character, and represent the objectives which every member of the profes-
sion should strive. Disciplinary Rules [hereinafter referred to as DR] are mandatory,
stating the minimum level of conduct below which lawyers cannot fall without being
subject to disciplinary action. See Preamble and Preliminary Statement to MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY.
2. "As used in DR 9-101(B) 'private employment' refers to employment as a private
practitioner." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342
[hereinafter cited as Opinion 342], reprinted in 62 A.B.A.J. 517, 519 (1976).
3. The term "same matter" is defined as
a discrete and isolatable transaction or a set of transactions between identifiable
parties .... The same lawsuit or litigation is the same matter.... By contrast,
work as a government employee in drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government
or agency procedures, regulations, or laws or in briefing abstract principles of law,
does not disqualify the lawyer under DR 9-101(B) from subsequent private em-
ployment involving the same regulations, procedures, or points of law; the "same
matter" is not involved because there is lacking the discrete, identifiable transac-
tions or conduct involving a particular situation and specific parties.
Opinion 342, supra note 2, at 519.
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sibility4 while working for the government.5 Violation of this rule
requires the former government attorney's disqualification from
the case at issue. The Code also provides that if an attorney is
disqualified under any of its rules, then all associates or mem-
bers of his firm should be disqualified.7 A literal reading of these
two rules, as applied to government attorneys, would be espe-
cially harsh since a government attorney is substantially in-
volved in a wide range of matters,' and the prospect of a law
firm being disqualified in an extensive number of cases, because
of the presence of a former government attorney on its staff,
would cause law firms to be extremely hesitant to hire such at-
torneys.9 Thus, the entailing label of government service would
inhibit the movement of many attorneys from the private to the
4. "Substantial responsibility" envisages a much closer and more direct relation-
ship than that of mere perfunctory approval or disapproval of the matter in ques-
tion. It contemplates a responsibility requiring the official to become personally
involved to an important, material degree in the investigative or deliberative
processes regarding the transactions or facts in question. Thus, being the chief
official in some vast office or organization does not ipso facto give that government
official or employee the "substantial responsibility" contemplated by the rule in
regard to all the minutiae of facts lodged within that office. Yet it is not necessary
that the public employee or official shall have personally and in a substantial
manner investigated or passed upon the particular matter, for it is sufficient that
he had such a heavy responsibility for the matter that it is unlikely he did not
become personally and substantially involved in the investigative or deliberative
processes regarding that matter.
Opinion 342, supra note 2, at 520.
Relevant considerations under DR 9-101(B) in determining whether the government
attorney had substantial responsibility for a matter are: Structure of the government
agency; the size of the particular division; the length of the chain of command; number
of positions between the attorney in question and person primarily responsible. See
Comment, The Former Government Attorney and the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity: Insulation or Disqualification?. 26 CATHOLIC U.L. Rev. 402, 406 (1977).
5. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101(B).
6. Although the Code of Professional Responsibility establishes proper guidelines
for the professional conduct of attorneys, a violation does not automatically result
in disqualification of counsel. The sanction of disqualification rests in the discre-
tion of the trial court and its determination will only be overturned upon a show-
ing of abuse of such discretion.
Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 991 (8th Cir.
1978). See W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir. 1976); Ceramco, Inc. v.
Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 1975).
7. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RSPONSIBILrry DR 5-105(D).
8. See infra note 44.
9. See Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
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public sector. 10
In cases where an attorney is claimed to have received confi-
dences from representing a client in a particular case,1 and he
subsequently joins a firm that seeks to represent a party adverse
to his former client in a substantially related case, the attorney
will be screened or isolated from the case to prevent disqualifica-
tion 2 of the firm.'3 A screening procedure, or "Chinese Wall,"
typically excludes the attorney from participating in the case at
issue, and from sharing in any fee charged by the firm for that
case.
1 4
In Armstrong v. McAlpin"5 the issue arose whether that
10. "The situation of the former government attorney or the attorney contemplating
government service is conducive to the overcautious approach. The restrictions placed
upon his future career are so unclear and may be so sterilizing that unless he is com-
pletely unwary he will hesitate before accepting government employment." Kaufman,
The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 HARv. L.
REv. 657, 657 (1957).
Government attorneys include the judiciary, elected officials, prosecutors, and law-
yers working for executive branch agencies. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILrly EC 8-8 and 7-13.
11. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. See generally MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmaLrry Canon Four.
12. Disqualification rules were fashioned at common law to assure the public that an
attorney would never disclose or utilize information obtained from the client without the
client's permission. The purpose of this assurance was to encourage a client to speak
freely to his attorney. See In re Boone, 83 F. 944 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 24-27.
14. "[S]creens" or "Chinese Walls" [are] procedures [that] aim to isolate the dis-
qualification to the lawyer or lawyers infected with the privileged information that
is the source of the ethical problem, and thereby to allow other attorneys in the
firm to carry on the questioned representation free of any taint of misuse of confi-
dences. Typical walling procedures include prohibiting the tainted attorney(s)
from having any connection with the case or receiving any share of the fees attrib-
utable to it, banning relevant discussions with or the transfer of relevant docu-
ments to or from the tainted attorney(s), restricting access to files, educating all
members of the firm as to the importance of the wall, and separating, both organi-
zationally and physically, groups of attorneys working on conflicting matters.
Note, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. Rzv. 677,
678 (1980).
Screening will ultimately depend upon the personal integrity of the attorneys in-
volved, which could be judged by a court through live testimony or affidavits. Opponents
of such procedures argue that the public is inherently skeptical of attorneys and that
such skepticism should preclude any use of screening. See Alexander, Screening Former
Government Attorneys to Prevent Disqualifying Their Law Firms, N.Y.S.B.J. 552, 556
n.45 (Dec. 1981).
15. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (Feinberg, J.) (en banc), va-
cated on juris. grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). A procedural issue in this case was
3
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same type of screening could be used to avoid disqualification of
the former government attorney's law firm in a matter the firm
was currently litigating, and for which he had substantial re-
sponsibility while with the government. The Second Circuit in
Armstrong held that unless the presence of the "screened off"
former government attorney at the firm threatened the integrity
of the underlying trial, any appearance of impropriety arising
solely from his mere presence would be "too slender a reed on
which to rest a disqualification order" against an entire law
firm."' If the rationale of this decision is followed by other
courts, any reluctance that firms may have had to hire a former
government attorney will be dispelled, and any disruption of the
flow of attorneys between the public and private sector will be
avoided.
Part II of this note explores the historical development of
firm disqualification and the use of Chinese Walls. Part III dis-
cusses the district court, three judge panel, and en banc deci-
sions. Part IV clarifies the en banc court's formulation and rea-
soning. This note concludes by agreeing with the en banc
decision that firm disqualification was not appropriate in this in-
stance, and with the court's approval of the use of screening to
avoid the vicarious disqualification of the former government at-
torney's firm.
II. Background: Historical Development
A. The Screening of Private Attorneys
Canon Five17 of the Model Code requires an attorney to
whether denial of a disqualification motion was immediately appealable under Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The court, in overruling Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975), held that
a denial of a disqualification motion was not appealable until after final judgment. Arm-
strong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 441. The Supreme Court vacated this decision apparently
because once the Second Circuit had decided the motion was not appealable it should
not have reached the merits of the case. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449
U.S. 368 (1981). Armstrong v. McAlpin, 449 U.S. at 1106. Although this decision lacks
precedential value, it is still important because of the Second Circuit's demonstrated
willingness to approve of screening devices involving a former government attorney. The
district court's decision, Armstrong v. McAlpin, 461 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), which
initially approved of the screening, can be cited to for precedential support.
16. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 445.
17. Canon Five provides that: "A lawyer should exercise independent professional
[Vol. 2:49
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss1/3
ARMSTRONG v. McALPIN
maintain and exercise professional independent judgment on be-
half of his client.1 ' In following the maxim that a servant cannot
serve two masters1 ' the Code precludes the simultaneous repre-
sentation by an attorney of two clients with conflicting interests
in the same matter.20 Situations may arise where an attorney
and the firm he is working for are representing clients with con-
flicting interests. The courts have found screening to be inade-
quate to prevent the disqualification of an entire law firm if one
of its attorneys is found to be representing a party with a con-
flicting interest. 1 The reasoning behind this principle is that
"[wihen two groups of attorneys within a single law firm are en-
gaged in conflicting representations at one and the same time,
there is a greater danger of disclosure of confidences than would
exist if one of the representations took place in the past.""
Canon Four'" of the Model Code requires an attorney to
preserve the confidences and secrets of his client.2 If an attor-
ney participates in a case adverse to the interests of a former
client, that client may allege that the attorney breached or may
breach the confidences of their former relationship. To disqual-
ify the attorney the former client must establish that there ex-
judgment on behalf of a client." MODEL CODE OF PROFEMSONAL RESPONSBJTY Canon
Five.
18. See MODEL CODE OF PmovassioNL RESPosmnrrv DR 5-101(A).
19. Matthew 6:24.
20. See Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); MoDzL CODE OF PRoF SSIONAL REsoNsmn.rrv EC 5-14.
21. See, eg., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 311 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Funds of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977).
22. Note, supra note 14, at 691.
23. Canon Four provides that- "A lawyer should preserve the confidences and
secrets of a client." MODEL CODE OF PROIOSSONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon Four.
24. "[Tlhe ethical duty [of Canon Four] is broader than the evidentiary privilege:
'This ethical precept unlike the evidentiary privilege exists without regard to the nature
or sources of information or the fact that others share the knowledge."' Avnet, Inc. v.
OEC Corp., 498 F. Supp. 818, 821 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (quoting Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's
Restaurant, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1979)). See also MODEL CODE OF Puom-
siONAL R PoNsmnry EC 4-4. MODEL CoDE OF PROFsSSIONAL RESPONSmlLITY DR 4-
101(A) provides that-
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under the applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the
professional relationship that the client has requested to be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to
the client.
1982]
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ists a substantial relationship between the former and subse-
quent case. 5 Once this is proven, the attorney is irrebuttably
presumed"' to have received confidences from his former client
as to the case in question, and therefore, is automatically
disqualified.2 7
The issue that had to be resolved under Canon Four was
whether the disqualified attorney should be irrebuttably pre-
sumed to have shared the confidences of his former client with
other members of his law firm,'2 and thus warrant disqualifica-
tion of the entire firm.2 The Second Circuit, in Silver Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,5 ' held that imputation
of information from a disqualified attorney to other members of
his firm was rebuttable through the use of a screening proce-
25. See Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); T.C. Theatres Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); H. DrIuNKER, LEGAL ETmics 135 (1953).
26. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978).
"To compel the client to show, in addition to establishing that the subject of the
present adverse representation is related to the former, the actual confidential
matters previously entrusted to the attorney and their possible value to the pre-
sent client would tear aside the protective cloak drawn about the lawyer-client
relationship. For the Court to probe further and sift the confidences in fact re-
vealed would require disclosure of the very matters intended to be protected by
the rule."
Id. at 224 n.3 (quoting T.C. Theatres Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp.
at 269).
27. See Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954) (Where an attorney had spent 80% of his time on motion picture
antitrust suits, participated in three lawsuits which involved the defendants, and al-
though there was no direct evidence that he had obtained confidences useful to him in
the present suit, he was still disqualified).
28. See Laskey Bros. of W. Va. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956). (This case involved the situation where two
members of a law partnership were barred from participating in a case from which one
partner was disqualified). Id. at 825-26.
29. The Second Circuit, in Laskey found that the second attorney was not disquali-
fied from handling a case which came to him after dissolution of the firm in absence of
proof that he had acquired confidential information. Id. at 826. Thus, Laskey set forth
the idea that the presumption of disclosed confidences could be rebutted.
30. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975). In this case, an associate for Kelly Drye Warren
Clark & Ellis resigned and established his own law firm. He had handled matters for
Chrysler Corporation while working at the firm. Subsequently, in his own partnership, he
was hired by Silver Chrysler Corporation in a dealer suit against Chrysler Motors Corp.
Id. at 752.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss1/3
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dure. 1 In Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium v. Baxter Travenol
Laboratories, Inc.,'" the Seventh Circuit held that the presump-
tion of shared confidences was rebuttable. The court found that
an affidavit submitted by the attorneys of a firm stating that
they did not receive information from a staff attorney, who was
substantially involved in the contested matter, and who had
since left their firm,83 effectively rebutted the presumption of
shared confidences." Although Silver Chrysler and Novo ap-
proved of a screening device as a procedure to prevent vicarious
disqualification, the question still remained whether such a pro-
cedure could be used to screen a former government attorney,
thereby preventing disqualification of his associates or firm.
B. The Screening of Former Government Attorneys
Canon Nine cautions attorneys to avoid appearances of im-
propriety,35 and usually applies in conjunction with some other
ethical violation."O That is, if there is a breach of confidence37 or
loyalty," an appearance of impropriety3 may also be found. Ca-
non Nine may also be deemed to have been violated through a
31. Id. at 757.
32. 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir.), rev'd on reh'g, 607 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1979). In Novo,
Granger Cook was a member of the Chicago law firm of Hume, Clements, Brinks, Wil-
lian, Olds & Cook, Ltd. (the Hume firm). During that time Baxter Laboratories was a
client of the firm, with Mr. Cook in charge of the account. When Cook left the Hume
firm he took the Baxter account with him and represented Baxter as defendant in a
patent infringement suit brought by Novo. The Hume firm appeared as counsel for
plaintiff Novo. Defendant Baxter opposed the appearance and filed a motion to disqual-
ify the Hume firm as counsel for Novo. The court, on rehearing en banc, denied the
motion. Id. at 194, 197.
33. Id. at 197.
34. Id.
35. Canon Nine provides that. "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of pro-
fessional impropriety." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmnxry Canon Nine.
36. See Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976) (Canons Five
and Nine); NCK Organization, Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128 (2nd Cir. 1976) (Canons
Four and Nine); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800
(2d Cir. 1974) (en banc), aff'd on reh'g, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975) (Canons Four and
Nine); General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974) (DR 9-
101(B) and Canon Nine); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973).
(Canons Four and Nine).
37. See supra note 23.
38. See supra note 17.
39. See supra note 35.
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breach of DR 9-101(B). Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) provides that
"[a] lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in
which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public
employee."4 The basis for this rule is that a government attor-
ney who enters private practice, and then becomes involved in
that same matter for which he had substantial responsibility
while with the government, may create the appearance that he
is: Obtaining an unfair advantage over opposing counsel because
of his knowledge of confidential agency policies relating to nego-
tiation techniques, enforcement practices or litigation strategies;
being placed in a favored position with former colleagues in the
government agency the attorney left; or abusing the power of his
office to obtain a position with a private law firm by acting fa-
vorably in his official capacity toward that firm.41 Thus, even if a
former government attorney is not guilty of any ethical miscon-
duct, DR 9-101(B) and Canon Nine allow for his disqualification
solely on appearances of impropriety.
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D), as amended in 1974, provides
that "[ijf a lawyer is required to decline employment or with-
draw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule no partner or
associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm,
may accept or continue such employment. ' '4" A complication
arises upon application of this rule in conjunction with DR 9-
101(B). If an attorney is disqualified under DR 9-101(B) solely
because of his substantial responsibility for the same matter
while with the government, any member of his law firm must
also be disqualified under DR 5-105(D).43 Under such a literal
reading, the screening of the former government attorney that is
40. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101(B).
Compare DR 9-101(B) with 18 U.S.C. § 207(a) (Supp. III 1979). Section 207(a) per-
manently prohibits a former U.S. government attorney from participating after termina-
tion of his- employment as an agent or attorney for anyone other than the United States
in connection with any judicial or other proceeding in which the "United States is a
party or has a direct and substantial interest and, in which he participated personally
and substantially as an officer or employee.. . ... Id. "Some authorities have interpreted
'substantial responsibility' to mean 'personal involvement to an important degree'.. . a
standard more clearly stated by the phrase 'personal and substantial.'" Model Rules of
Professional Conduct DR 9-101 notes at 305 (Alternative Draft 1981) (citing Opinion
342, supra note 2, at 520). See supra note 4.
41. See Comment, supra note 4, at 405-06.
42. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITy DR 5-105(D).
43. See Comment, supra note 4, at 409.
[Vol. 2:49
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used to prevent the vicarious disqualification of his law firm is
inoperative since firm disqualification is mandatory under this
interpretation. Given the possibility of firm disqualification in a
wide range of cases," private firms would be reluctant to hire
former government attorneys. Government agencies, therefore,
claimed that a literal reading of DR 5-105(D) together with DR
9-101(B) would brand young government attorneys seeking pri-
vate positions as legal "Typhoid Marys,"' 45 and reduce the gov-
ernment's ability to attract high quality legal talent."
To alleviate the harsh effects of a literal reading of DR 5-
105(D) and DR 9-101(B) the ABA committee issued Opinion
342.4v This opinion allowed for the screening of a former govern-
ment attorney, and disregarded the literal reading of DR 5-
105(D) and DR 9-101(B). Opinion 342 appeared to balance the
need for protecting the integrity of the legal profession with the
concern of unnecessarily burdening former government attor-
neys. The ABA committee found that the purpose of the exten-
sion of disqualification to all affiliated lawyers was to prevent
the circumvention by a lawyer of the disciplinary rules.' s An in-
flexible application of DR 5-105(D) resulting in automatic firm
disqualification because a staff attorney was disqualified due to
past governmental service was viewed as unworkable in light of a
number of enunciated policy considerations.' A total preclusion
of screening was seen as serving "no worthwhile public interest
if it becomes a mere tool enabling a litigant to improve his pros-
pects by depriving his opponent of competent counsel.'"e The
committee reiterated the argument that the "ability of govern-
ment to recruit young professionals and competent lawyers
should not be interfered with by imposition of harsh restraints
44. No present young lawyer, after serving a one-year term as a Supreme Court,
court of appeals, or district court law clerk, could join any law firm that had even
a rooting interest for a client in any case that had been before the court. Neither
could many young lawyers now serving at the I.R.S., the S.E.C., or the Antitrust
Division join a firm .. .in which they had participated.
Cutler, Legal Ethics Forum, 63 A.B.A.J. 725, 727 (1977).
45. Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
46. Id. at 793-94.
47. Opinion 342, supra note 2, at 517.
48. Id. at 520.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 518.
1982]
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upon future practice....
Opinion 342 proposed that the government agency, for
whom the attorney had worked, review the screening procedure
adopted by the firm, and "determine whether the procedure ef-
fectively isolated the individual lawyer from participating in the
particular matter, and sharing in the fees attributable to it." '
By screening the attorney from the case, with the approval of his
former agency, and still allowing for the possible disqualification
of his entire law firm, the committee hoped to discourage any
incentive to use a public office as a bargaining chip for private
employment.58 Although Opinion 342 did not provide for judicial
review of a screening procedure already approved or rejected by
a government agency, in light of the well established common
law rule that it is within the court's province to supervise the
conduct of those attorneys litigating before it," this author be-
lieves that the drafters of the opinion would have explicitly pre-
cluded judicial review had they intended to do so.
Those who argue for a literal reading of DR 5-105(D) and
DR 9-101(B) reject the approach of Opinion 342.55 Claiming that
no workable standard has been devised that determines when
such a screening procedure is effective, they argue that policing
violations are virtually impossible once a waiver of firm disquali-
fication is granted by a governmental agency." Additionally,
they point out that agency lawyers who pass upon the effective-
ness of the screening procedure adopted by a law firm on behalf
of a former colleague would have a personal incentive in approv-
ing the screening procedure because they will "be making similar
51. Id.
52. Id. at 521.
53. Id.
54. See supra note 6. See also In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Va.
1981)
[Diespite a Government waiver, it remains the clear and independent duty of the
Court to scrutinize the screening procedures and to disqualify the firm if the
Court finds that, despite the attempted screening, continued representation con-
stitutes a threat to the integrity of the trial. . . . [I]f, after evaluating the suffi-
ciency of a proposed screen a court still harbors doubts as to the sufficiency of...
[the] screen the court should resolve the issue in favor of disqualification.
Id. at 922. See also infra text accompanying notes 63, 70.
55. See, e.g., Freedman, Legal Ethics Forum 63 A.B.A.J. 724, 725 (1977); Inquiry 19,
District Lawyer 39 (Fall 1972) (as discussed in Comment, supra note 4, at 402, 415-16).
56. See, e.g., Freedman, Legal Ethics Forum 63 A.B.A.J. 724-25 (1977).
[Vol. 2:49
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requests for waivers when they leave governmental service.",
Further, they assert that when a former government attorney
has had personal and substantial involvement in a matter while
with the government, DR 5-105(D) and DR 9-101(B) should be
read to preclude the use of a screening device," and thereby re-
sult in the vicarious disqualification of his law firm.59
Two recent decisions, however, have followed Opinion 342.
In Kesselhaut v. United States" the court of claims coined the
term "Typhoid Marys" 1 in describing the effect on young gov-
ernment attorneys if DR 5-105(D) was rigidly applied in con-
junction with DR 9-101(B). The court referred to Opinion 342 in
stating
that an inexorable disqualification of an entire firm for the dis-
qualification of a single member or associate, is entirely too harsh
and should be mitigated by the appropriate screening.., when
truly unethical conduct has not taken place and the matter is
merely one of superficial appearance of evil, which a knowledge of
the facts will dissipate.'
In this case, the government refused to approve the pro-
posed screening procedure. The court found that the govern-
ment's withholding of its consent of the screening procedure was
unjustified and not binding on the court."3
In Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Stores, Inc.,"
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. In the following cases a law firm was vicariously disqualified: Schloetter v. Railoc
of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976); Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d
1384 (2d Cir. 1976); General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir.
1974).
60. 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977). In Kesselhaut, Mr. Prothro was general counsel for
the Federal Housing Administration before joining Krooth and Altman. The Kesselhaut
firm had represented the FHA in a tax abatement case, and a fee controversy developed.
The Kesselhaut firm thereafter retained Krooth and Altman as counsel in an action
against the FHA. Although Prothro was disqualified, the FHA claimed that the entire
firm of Krooth and Altman should be disqualified. The court held that disqualification of
the entire firm was not necessary given the effectiveness of the adopted screening proce-
dures. Id. at 794. The court of claims reiterated its approval of screening former govern-
ment attorneys in Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc. v. United States, 639 F.2d 749 (Ct. Cl.
1981).
61. 555 F.2d at 793.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 573 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1978).
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the Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's refusal to disqualify
a law firm because two members of the law firm had previously
worked for the government in a closely related case. Without
specifically citing Opinion 342, the court of appeals approved the
use of screening devices as a way of avoiding automatic disquali-
fication of an entire law firm.Es
1. The Proposed Model Rule
The recently proposed Model Rules of Professional Respon-
sibility" follow the trend started by Opinion 342 in allowing the
screening of a former government attorney to avoid the vicarious
disqualification of his associates." The proposed disciplinary
rule provides that a lawyer may not represent "a private client
in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, un-
less the appropriate government agency consents after disclo-
sure."68 Additionally,
no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may un-
dertake or continue representation in the matter unless: the dis-
qualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter
and is apportioned no part of the fee .. .and written notice is
promptly given to the appropriate government agency to enable
the agency to ascertain compliance with the provisions of [the]
disciplinary rule."
The authors of the proposed Model Rules point out that
consent of the affected government agency is not necessary since
65. Id. at 993.
66. See supra note 1.
67. The ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct abolishes the use of "appearance of impropriety" as a
standard to be applied when dealing with issues of vicarious disqualification.
If [appearance of impropriety] were adopted, disqualification would become little
more than a question of subjective judgment by the former client. Second, since
"impropriety" is undefined, the term "appearance of impropriety" is question beg-
ging. It, therefore, has to be recognized that the problem of imputed disqualifica-
tion cannot be properly resolved either by simple analogy. .. or by the very gen-
eral concept of appearance of impropriety.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT DR 5-111 comment at 163 (Alternative Draft
1981).
68. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 9-101(A) (Alternative Draft 1981).
69. Id. DR 9-101(D) (emphasis added).
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a mandatory requirement would provide agencies with unregu-
lated discretionary power.70 Thus, the authors make clear in
their commentary what Opinion 342 did not clarify. That is, al-
though government review and approval of a screening proce-
dure is suggested, it is not necessarily the final authority in rul-
ing upon the effectiveness of such devices.
C. The Nyquist Rule
The basis of Armstrong was set forth in Board of Education
v. Nyquist. 1 The Nyquist decision dealt only with the issue of
disqualification of a private attorney during trial due to a possi-
ble appearance of impropriety. 2 The Nyquist court found that
attorney disqualification should occur primarily when an attor-
ney acts in conflict with an interest of a current client thereby
violating Canons Five and Nine, and where the attorney threat-
ens to violate Canons Four and Nine by placing himself in a po-
sition to use privileged information concerning the other side
through his prior representation."' Outside these two circum-
stances, the Second Circuit stated that considerable reluctance
should be shown by courts in disqualifying attorneys.1 4 The ba-
sic considerations of the court's reluctance to disqualify an at-
torney were the immediate adverse affect on the client by sepa-
rating him from counsel of his own choice, and the possible use
of disqualification motions to delay the trial.'5 The court con-
cluded that unless a violation of Canon Four or Five was estab-
lished in conjunction with Canon Nine, an attorney should not
be disqualified solely because of an appearance of impropriety
unless the "attorney's conduct tends 'to taint the underlying
70. Id. DR 9-101(D) noteas at 307.
71. 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979). In Nyquist the disqualification motion was aimed
at an attorney who was not associated with government service. Id. at 1243, 1244. The
case involved the appointment of an attorney by a teacher's union to represent the male
members in an action contesting seniority listing based on sex. Id. The female members
of the union claimed that this limited appointment created an appearance of impropri-
ety. Id. at 1244. The female members argued that such an appearance of impropriety
could only be avoided if counsel were supplied by the union to represent them, or in the
alternative, if the counsel representing the male teachers were disqualfied. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1246.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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trial.' ",76
III. Armstrong v. McAlpin
A. Facts
Theodore Altman, who was the Assistant Director of the Di-
vision of Enforcement for the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion,7 left the SEC in 1975 to become an associate at the firm of
Gordon Hurwitz Butowsky Baker Weitzer and Shalov.'8 Prior to
leaving the SEC, Altman had supervised an action against Clovis
McAlpin, the highest executive officer of a group of related in-
vestment companies known as the Capital Growth Companies.'
Following a default judgment in this action the district court ap-
pointed a receiver to oversee the financial interests of the inves-
tors of Capital Growth.80 The receiver employed the Gordon
firm after his original counsel had resigned. 81 Subsequently, the
receiver filed an action against McAlpin to recover twenty-four
million dollars he allegedly stole from Capital Growth.82 The
Gordon firm concluded that Altman should be disqualified be-
cause of his supervision of the SEC investigation, and therefore
screened Altman from the suit. The SEC and district court ap-
proved the arrangement.88
The defendant filed a motion to disqualify the Gordon firm
because of Altman's prior involvement in the case." The district
court denied the disqualification motion since it could not find
any actual misdoing or significant appearance of impropriety."
76. Id. (quoting W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 678 (2d Cir. 1976)).
77. Hereinafter the SEC.
78. [Hereinafter the Gordon firm]. Altman joined the Gordon firm in October 1975.
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 436.
79. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 435.
80. Armstrong, as receiver, had the responsibility of attempting to recover all mon-
ies and property which were due Capital Growth shareholders. Id.
81. Barrett Smith Shapiro & Simon was originally appointed counsel, but disquali-
fied itself in 1976. Id. at 436.
82. Id. at 434.
83. Id. at 436.
84. Id. at 436, 437. Appellee's brief indicates that the Gordon firm was not the origi-
nal choice, but was hired only after several other firms had turned down their offer.
Appellee's Brief on Rehearing En Banc at 7, Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d
Cir. 1980).
85. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 461 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Werker, J.).
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The Second Circuit, in a panel decision, reversed the district
court, and ruled that regardless of the Chinese Wall used to
screen Altman from the instant case, the entire Gordon firm still
should be disqualified.86 The issue on appeal to the Second Cir-
cuit, en banc, was whether the entire Gordon firm should be dis-
qualified, even though Altman had been disqualified and
screened"7 from the Capital Growth case."
B. The District Court
The defendant, McAlpin, moved to dismiss the Gordon firm
claiming that, as the Assistant Director at the SEC, Altman di-
rectly and personally conducted and supervised the related in-
vestigation and enforcement proceeding against McAlpin, which
was the basis of the instant action.89 The defendant claimed that
the Gordon firm had access to all of Altman's SEC records, and
that they were not made available to the defendant. 0 The de-
fendant insisted that no screening procedure had ever been
adopted by the Gordon firm that effectively separated Altman
from the instant case, 1 and argued that even if such a screening
procedure had been adopted it would have been barred by DR
5-105(D) and DR 9-101(B).2
Judge Werker dismissed the defendant's motion to disqual-
ify the Gordon firm.93 In rejecting a literal reading of DR 5-
105(D) and DR 9-101(B) the judge stated that "the proper
screening of Altman rather than disqualification of the Gordon
86. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J.).
87. The initial screening and disqualification of Altman was approved by the SEC in
accordance with federal regulations, see Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 436, specifi-
cally, 17 C.F.R. § 200.735-8(b)(2) (1981).
Waivers [of firm disqualification] ordinarily will be granted [by the SEC] where
the firm makes a satisfactory representation that it has adopted screening mea-
sures which will effectively isolate the individual lawyer disqualified under para-
graph (a)(1) from participating in the particular matter or matters and from shar-
ing in any fees attributable to it.
Id.
88. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 434.
89. Appellant's Brief on Rehearing En Banc at 4, Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d
433 (2d Cir. 1980).
90. Id. at 7.
91. Id. at 19.
92. Id. at 13.
93. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 461 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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firm [was] the solution to the . . . dispute."' The court noted
that the retention of the Gordon firm did not prejudice the de-
fendant.'5 The court found that the SEC provided the receiver
with the documents in question prior to his retention of the
Gordon firm, and noted that the receiver was prepared to pro-
vide any and all of this information to the defendant. Addition-
ally, the court found that: There was no indication Altman had
an intent to prosecute a later action involving Capital Growth;
Altman and his two partners attested under penalty of perjury
that he had never discussed the action with other members of
the firm; and there was no proof he shared in the firm's income
derived from prosecution of the action." The court concluded
that Altman had not participated in any ethical misconduct.' 7 In
light of these findings the court found that the screening of Alt-
man from the suit was an effective procedure in dispelling any
appearances of impropriety that may have arisen from his prior
governmental involvement in the SEC enforcement proceedings
against McAlpin, and the Gordon firm's subsequent representa-
tion of the receiver, with Altman on its staff.8
C. The Three Judge Panel Decision
The Second Circuit's panel opinion" reversed the district
court's decision and granted the motion to disqualify the
Gordon firm. Judge Newman, who wrote the decision, declared
that "[a] government attorney with direct, personal involvement
in a matter involving enforcement of laws that are the basis for
private causes of action must understand, and it must appear to
the public, that there will be no possibility of financial reward if
he succumbs to the temptation to shape the government action
in the hope of enhancing private employment." 100 If the attor-
ney's role while with the government was personal and substan-
tial, the court reasoned that an Opinion 342 screening procedure
would not destroy the incentive of a government attorney to
94. Id. at 626.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 625.
98. Id. at 626.
99. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979) (panel opinion) (Newman, J.).
100. Id. at 34.
[Vol. 2:49
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss1/3
ARMSTRONG v. McALPIN
handle his work so as to affect his future employment.101 In sup-
port of this claim, Judge Newman pointed out that a screening
procedure could be easily circumvented by upwardly adjusting
the former government attorney's salary in order to allow him to
profit monetarily from the case he was supposedly screened
from.10 2
The court concluded that although neither Altman nor the
Gordon firm had committed any impropriety, "[iun view of the
type of matter Altman handled for the SEC and his direct per-
sonal involvement with it, disqualification of his firm [was] re-
quired."' 03 Thus, the disqualification of the Gordon firm was
viewed as "a prophylactic measure to guard against misuse of
authority by government lawyers."'"
D. The Decision En Banc
1. Majority
The court of appeals, rehearing the case en banc, reversed
the three judge panel decision. 10 5 Judge Feinberg reiterated the
district court's factual findings,'" and concluded that because
the district court justifiably found no actual misdoing on the
part of Altman or the Gordon firm, disqualification could be
based only on the appearance of impropriety stemming from
Altman's association with the firm.'0 7
In dealing with the question of whether the Gordon firm
should be disqualified solely because of possible appearances of
impropriety arising from Altman's presence on the firm's staff,
even though he was already screened, the court relied upon the
principle it enunciated in Nyquist. s08 Although Nyquist was fac-
tually unrelated to this case, the Second Circuit applied the con-
cept that disqualification could not be based solely on Canon
Nine unless there existed a substantial appearance of impropri-
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Feinberg, J.),
vacated on juris. grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
106. Id. at 442-43,
107. Id. at 445.
108. 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979).
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ety that threatened to taint the integrity of the underlying
trial.""'
The court stated that it would not become involved in the
full fray of arguments concerning a literal reading of DR 9-
101(B) and DR 5-105(D). 10 The court still, however, went on to
agree with the rationale of Opinion 342,1 and found that a de-
cision rejecting the efficacy of screening procedures within this
context could hamper the government's efforts to hire qualified
attorneys and transform such attorneys into legal "Typhoid
Marys" because of government service.1 '
While recognizing that reasonable minds can and do differ
over the ethical propriety of screening devices, the court found
that to disallow the screening of Altman as ineffective per se,
and thus warrant disqualification of the Gordon firm, would cre-
ate serious adverse consequences.1 3 That is, to separate the re-
ceiver from his counsel would seriously delay and impede, and
perhaps altogether thwart his attempt to obtain redress for de-
fendant's alleged frauds. 1 4 The court concluded that under
"these circumstances, the possible 'appearance of impropriety is
simply too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification or-
der. . . particularly. . . where the appearance of impropriety is
not very clear.' "115 Although he acknowledged, without elabora-
tion, that there could be unusual situations where there is a suf-
ficient appearance of impropriety that warrants firm disqualifi-
cation, Judge Feinberg concluded that this was not such a
case.
116
2. Dissent
In repeating the basic theme of the panel decision, Judge
Newman stated that the "purposes of DR 9-101(B) cannot be
fully achieved unless there is no possibility that the government
attorney could be (or seem to be) influenced by the prospect of
109. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 445.
110. Id. at 444.
111. Id. at 443.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 445.
114. Id. at 446.
115. Id. at 445 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Nyquist at 1247).
116. Id. at 446.
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later private employment. '117 His sole concern was the public
perception of lawyers, rather than the efficiency and integrity of
the underlying trial. "It may well be that no matter how this
litigation develops, Altman will in fact not disclose to his part-
ners anything he learned while exercising substantial govern-
ment responsibilities for related matters. But the public will not
believe it."11' Judge Newman concluded that appearance of im-
propriety and public misconception could be avoided only if DR
5-105(D) and DR 9-101(B) were applied as written, and that the
court should have required disqualification of the entire law firm
regardless of the use of screening procedures.11'
IV. Analysis
A. Approval of Screening a Former Government Attorney
The Second Circuit's approval of the screening of Theodore
Altman to avoid disqualification of the Gordon firm is significant
because it gave recognition to the approach of Opinion 342.120
The court rejected the argument that DR 5-105(D) and DR 9-
101(B) should be applied literally when faced with the question
of whether or not a law firm of the former government attorney
should be vicariously disqualified from a case because the former
government attorney was substantially responsible for the same
matter while working for the government. 12 1 The court, in effect,
announced its opposition to any view that screening devices
were ineffective per se solely because a former government attor-
ney was involved.
1. The Emphasis on Nyquist
At first glance, the heavy emphasis on Nyquist by the court
of appeals, en banc, might seem perplexing. Nyquist was a case
that did not involve screening, and only dealt with the issue of
whether one private attorney should be disqualified.122 The
117. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 453 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 453.
119. Id. at 454.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 47-54.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
122. See supra note 71.
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court's approach can be best understood by its efforts to deal
with the argument that the mere presence of Theodore Altman
on the staff of the Gordon firm created a sufficient appearance
of impropriety to warrant the firm's disqualification. The court,
in applying the Nyquist rule, was seeking to negate the argu-
ment that the threat of public skepticism would always render
ineffective the screening of former government attorneys. In re-
stricting the applicability of "appearance of impropriety" the
court made clear that there would have to be established the
presence of an existing threat to the integrity of the underlying
trial in order to find the screening of a former government attor-
ney to be ineffective. Thus, the Nyquist rule was applied to the
facts of this case to restrict and limit the speculative use of
"public skepticism" and "appearance of impropriety" to render
ineffective the screening of former government attorneys.
2. Lack of Specificity
Criticism can be made of the court's failure to explain what
would constitute a substantial appearance of impropriety, and at
what point the integrity of the underlying trial could be deemed
threatened. This omission can be justifiably explained by the
fact that the court may have been seeking to avoid a rigid rule
that set forth, as a matter of law, when such screening proce-
dures would be effective or ineffective. Instead, the court sought
to allow the lower courts to decide, on a case by case basis, the
effectiveness of the disputed screening procedure since they
would be more familiar with the facts of the case in question.
3. An Example
A hypothetical example would be helpful in clarifying the
guidelines established by the Second oCircuit in Armstrong. As-
sume that in Armstrong the district court accepted the allega-
tion made by the defendant: That the Gordon firm received cer-
tain documents solely through Altman's access to them while he
was supervising the enforcement proceeding against the defen-
dant, and that the defendant had been denied access to those
documents by the SEC and the Gordon firm. The district court,
under the court of appeals' new standard, would have to decide
whether in its discretion such a situation creates a substantial
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appearance of impropriety, and a threat to the integrity of the
underlying trial. In reviewing the facts, the district court may
conclude that since the documents were of such importance, and
it was not possible for McAlpin to obtain these documents, there
would exist such an unfair advantage to the Gordon firm over
the defendant's attorneys that it would give rise to a substantial
appearance of impropriety, and create a threat to the integrity
of the underlying trial.12 3 As such, the court could in its discre-
tion declare the screening of Altman to be ineffective in remedy-
ing the existing unfairness, and order the disqualification of the
entire Gordon firm from the instant case.
4. Problems with the Dissenting Opinion
The error in Judge Newman's dissenting opinion is that it
focuses solely on the concern that the public will not trust the
effectiveness of a Chinese Wall when used to screen a former
government attorney. The claims that it might seem improper
for a former government attorney's firm to be litigating a matter
that he was previously involved in while with the government,
that the attorney and firm could easily circumvent the screening
procedure by slipping confidential information to other members
of his firm, or that the attorney could continue to benefit mone-
tarily from his firm's litigation of the case, are too broad and
predeterminative. It ignores the concept that each case is factu-
ally unique, and that screening can remedy unfairness due to the
former government attorney's presence on the staff of the firm.
Clearly, any screening procedure will not be perfect, since it de-
pends upon the honesty and integrity of the attorney and firm
involved, and the movement of a public official to a private firm
will inevitably produce some skeptical comment. Still, it would
seem quite harsh to disqualify an entire law firm solely because
of the mere presence of the former government attorney on its
staff without any other proof that there exists a serious unfair-
ness due to the former government attorney's prior governmen-
tal involvement in the same matter.
Although public trust in government officials is an impor-
tant factor in maintaining confidence in and credibility of such
123. See supra text accompanying notes 109-116.
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officials, the public also has an interest in the expediency and
fairness of the judicial process. To allow disqualification of a for-
mer government attorney's law firm solely because the attorney
was substantially responsible for the case as a government em-
ployee 124 ignores the policy considerations that have been set
forth in Opinion 342,11" by a substantial number of authorative
commentators,"' and in the proposed Model Rules. 11 7
The dissent overlooks the fact that a trial court will have
the opportunity to review any adopted screening procedure. If
there appears to have been any favoritism exhibited by the gov-
ernment agency initially approving the procedure, or any cir-
cumvention of the adopted screening procedure on the part of
the firm and former government attorney, the court may declare
it void and act accordingly in its discretion. As seen in the exam-
ple above, 1" 8 the court may find that the presence of the former
government attorney on the staff of the private firm gives the
firm such a distinct and unfair advantage over the counsel of the
moving party that vicarious disqualification is the only remedy
to alleviate the unfairness. 12 Declaring screening ineffective per
se, without specific allegations which establish a substantial ap-
pearance of impropriety, will serve only to disrupt the trial pro-
cess, to deprive a client of his choice of counsel, and to discour-
age entry by attorneys into governmental agencies.
124. See supra text accompanying note 40.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 47-54.
126. See, e.g., Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics, 70 HAnv. L. REv. 657 (1957); Van Graafeiland, Lawyer's Conflict of
Interest-A Judge's View Part II, N.Y.L.J., July 20, 1977, at 1, col. 2; Comment, Con-
flicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65 Gao. L. J. 1025 (1977); Lieb-
man, The Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73
Nw. U.L. REv. 996 (1979).
127. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNucr DR 9-101 comment at 301.
128. See supra the hypothetical example at Part IV A(3) of the text.
129. See supra note 54. See also Sierra Vista, Inc. v. United States, 639 F.2d 749
(Ct. Cl. 1981). (The court of claims found that the trial judge had properly denied the
government's motion to disqualify the firm where only one of the lawyers involved had
any substantial connection with the case while with the government. The court found
that the screening of the attorney who had substantial involvement in the case would be
effective). Id. at 753. Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980). (The court was
not satisfied that screening in this particular case was effective to prevent disclosure to
the firm of information the lawyer had obtained during his prior service with a non-
governmental public interest organization).
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5. The Effectiveness of the Screening Procedure in
Armstrong
The Second Circuit was correct in affirming the district
court's finding that Altman's presence at the Gordon firm did
not require the firm's disqualification. The receiver had access to
the SEC files prior to the Gordon firm's retention. Altman could
not foresee the receiver's counsel resigning and the receiver's
choice of the Gordon firm as a replacement.1 30 Additionally, the
screening of Altman from any participation in the instant case
further rebutted any possible inferences of impropriety arising
from his presence at the firm, and no evidence was introduced
that indicated that there was any attempt to circumvent such
procedures."'1
V. Conclusion
Armstrong v. McAlpin will allow trial courts to evaluate on
a case by case basis the screening of former government attor-
neys. 1 2 The Armstrong decision rejects the argument that such
procedures are ineffective per se solely because the public's atti-
tude will be very skeptical if a former government attorney was
substantially responsible for the same matter from which he was
screened at his firm.
The prior case of Board of Education v. Nyquist set forth
the concept that disqualification of an attorney based solely on
an appearance of impropriety should not occur unless the integ-
rity of the underlying trial was threatened. The Armstrong court
found that the Nyquist rationale should be applied to uphold
the use of procedures in screening a former government attorney
from a particular case in order to avoid disqualification of his
entire firm. Thus, unless the facts of the case indicate that the
former government attorney's presence on the staff of his firm
taints the underlying trial, the trial court should approve his
screening.
John J. Rapisardi
130. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 461 F. Supp. at 626.
131. Id.
132. See supra note 15.
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